2016 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

3-17-2016

USA v. Lester Anderson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016

Recommended Citation
"USA v. Lester Anderson" (2016). 2016 Decisions. 290.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2016/290

This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2016 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 15-1494
_____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.
LESTER ANDERSON,
Appellant
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 2-13-cr-00119-001)
District Judge: Hon. Lawrence F. Stengel
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 25, 2016
______________
Before: VANASKIE, SHWARTZ, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 17, 2016)
___________
OPINION*
___________
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.

Appellant Lester Anderson appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to
suppress evidence that Anderson contends was obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The District Court denied Anderson’s motion, concluding that the police
conduct in entering his home and arresting him were reasonable due to exigent
circumstances. For the reasons discussed below, we agree that the police conduct was
reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes due to the presence of exigent circumstances.
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
I.
At approximately 4:30 a.m. on December 31, 2012, Officer Lamont Lister went
into a 7-Eleven while on duty. Because Officer Lister was on restricted duty at the time,
he was unarmed and not in uniform. While Officer Lister was inside the 7-Eleven, a
masked man entered the store and drew a gun on the cashier, demanding that he open the
register. After taking the money from the register, the robber walked out of the store.
Officer Lister followed the thief and called 911 to report the robbery. At some point, the
robber removed his ski mask and Officer Lister saw his face. Officer Lister continued to
follow the perpetrator and saw him enter either 2216 or 2218 Bonsall Street.1
A few minutes later Officer William Mayhew arrived and approached the front
door of 2216 Bonsall Street along with Officer Lister, while another officer secured the
back of the home. The door was slightly ajar, so it swung open when Officer Mayhew
knocked. Officer Mayhew entered through the open door into an enclosed porch,
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The front doors of the two addresses were adjacent and shared a set of stairs.
Officer Lister saw Anderson go up the stairs but did not see which door he entered.
2

followed by Officer Lister. Anderson approached the doorway from inside and said:
“What the fuck are you doing in my house?” (Jt. App., Vol II, at 85.) Officer Lister then
stated, “That’s him.” (Id.) Officer Mayhew grabbed Anderson and a struggle ensued.
Officer Mayhew was able to subdue Anderson and put him in handcuffs. Anderson was
taken out of the house to a police vehicle, where another scuffle took place. During this
encounter, Officer Lister heard a “metallic clank” and observed a 9mm handgun on the
ground. (Id. at 86.) Officer Lister recognized the handgun as the weapon he had seen
Anderson wield during the robbery. After Anderson was again under control, the cashier
from the 7-Eleven arrived at the scene and identified Anderson as the robber. Thereafter,
police secured a search warrant for 2216 Bonsall Street and found $57 in cash and a black
ski mask inside. Additionally, while in police custody, Anderson confessed to the
robbery.
A federal grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania indicted
Anderson on one count of robbery which interferes with interstate commerce, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); one count of using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); and one count of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Anderson moved to suppress the
handgun, cash, black ski mask, Officer Lister’s identification, and Anderson’s
confession, alleging that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures by entering his house. After an evidentiary hearing,
the District Court denied the motion, concluding that the police conduct was reasonable
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due to exigent circumstances. Thereafter, Anderson pleaded guilty to all three counts, but
preserved his right to appeal the District Court’s denial of the motion to suppress.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review the District Court’s denial of a motion
to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings and we exercise plenary
review over questions of law.” United States v. Lowe, 791 F.3d 424, 427 (3d Cir. 2015)
(quoting United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2006)). Specifically, “on
appeal from a decision involving the presence or absence of exigent circumstances
justifying a warrantless search or seizure, this Court will review the district court’s
findings of fact for clear error, but will review its conclusion that those facts establish a
legal exigency de novo.” United States v. Mallory, 765 F.3d 373, 383 (3d Cir. 2014).
III.
A warrantless search or arrest made within a home is presumptively unreasonable.
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980). Nonetheless, a warrantless search or
seizure occurring within a home may be sustained where probable cause and exigent
circumstances exist. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011); Mallory, 765 F.3d at
383. “Examples of exigent circumstances include, but are not limited to, hot pursuit of a
suspected felon, the possibility that evidence may be removed or destroyed, and danger to
the lives of officers or others.” United States v. Coles, 437 F.3d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 2006).
Factors that support a finding of exigent circumstances include: (1) the gravity of the
crime that has been committed; (2) a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed; (3) a
4

clear showing of probable cause based upon reasonably trustworthy information; (4) a
strong belief that the suspect is in the premises; (5) “a likelihood that the suspect will
escape if not swiftly apprehended”; and (6) peaceable entry, affording the suspect “an
opportunity to surrender . . . without a struggle and thus to avoid the invasion of privacy
involved in entry into the home.” Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 392–93 (D.C.
Cir. 1970)(en banc).2
The District Court accurately recounted the evidence supporting its findings that
each of the Dorman factors was satisfied: Officer Lister had witnessed a violent crime,
the armed robbery of a convenience store. The perpetrator retained the weapon after
leaving the store, and was followed to the residence on Bonsall Street. The police arrived
at the residence just minutes after the suspect entered it. Office Lister was concerned that
the suspect would get away if not apprehended immediately. Officer Mayhew acted
reasonably in knocking on the door, and the door opened without use of force. When the
door opened, Officer Mayhew was confronted by a man whom Officer Lister identified
as the suspect. The District Court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and its
legal conclusion that the exigencies of the circumstances warranted the entry into the
home and the arrest of Anderson is not erroneous. Accordingly, the motion to suppress
was properly denied.
IV.
For the forgoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

The Supreme Court has referred to Dorman as “a leading federal case defining
exigent circumstances.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 751 (1984).
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